Taxonomy of Nihilism

 The Types of Nihilism

We are in a meaning crisis. The spectre of Nihilism looms, casting a shadow over us all. 

Nihilism has arisen because of the faults in our collective philosophy. True Nihilism neither prescribes nor proscribes any action or non-action either way. If one were truly a Nihilist, and we were to say that true Nihilism suggests that there is no reason to act on any value, even one's impulse to scratch an itch or eat food, it would still require some kind of motivation to hold fast in being a consistent Nihilist; it would require some motivation - which would exist for some reason - to resist these impulses. And thus a true Nihilist is completely indistinguishable from anybody else.

But in practice, almost nobody recognises this; least of all the Nihilists themselves. Were this our criterion for Nihilism, nobody would be a Nihilist. Instead, Nihilism is therefore somebody who is simply in the position of not affirming (either by omission, or by outright negation) the 'rightness' of any value whatsoever. Such a Nihilist may continue to act similarly to any other person; they may have any number or breadth of values, that they act as if they truly hold (and thus in substance actually do). Nonetheless, when asked to reflect on those values, they can find no justification for any of it, again whether explicitly or implicitly, and often find their own worldview negating them.

There are multiple reasons people end up at Nihilism. And thus, there are multiple types of Nihilist. Not being true Nihilists, they thus can be characterised by their attitudes, behaviour, and values, and most importantly, the reasons themselves.

Objective Nihilist

The Objective Nihilist is the one who rejects values on the basis that they are not 'objective'. The sense of 'objective' here is that of 'mind-independence', which is identified in the status of literal objects. In other words, because values, especially ethics, concern feelings (subjective experience, or phenomena), and not commonly perceptible, composite objects to be viewed by multiple people at different angles, the Objective Nihilist declares the topic of values to be empty of all content, arbitrary, and so on, all under the term 'subjective'. They will typically also include things like scientific laws in their account of what is real, because these laws can rigorously account for multiple perspectives, much like an object.

My objection to this form of Nihilism is that objectivity or objectness (and related things like scientific laws) are not the criterion for reality, truth, or knowledge, much less goodness, rightness, or wisdom. Objectivity begins in empiricism, which is definitionally 'subjective' and phenomenal; no given observation whatsoever is actually available to anybody else, and so all we do is come up with ideas that account for multiple.

Fact Nihilist

The fact Nihilist treats mere appeals to the fact-of-the-matter, the simple reality of things, as a refutation of values. They may say "That's just how it is." or "I can say things should be better, but the reality doesn't care." The defining feature of this rationale is that it is not an appeal to practicality or a likelihood of plans to succeed, or the ability of people to change things; it is taken as a fundamental disproof that something could ever matter at all.

My objection to this kind of Fact Nihilism is that... [fill in]

Power Nihilist

"Might makes right" leads inevitably to Nihilism, because all that happens is the result of its cause having the power to effect it.

This reasoning is often fallen into because of one of the fundamental laws of ethics: That ought implies can. The Power Nihilist (whether explicitly or inadvertently) affirms the consequent, and thus their reasoning amounts to the idea that can implies ought, or that the ability to do something alone makes it acceptable.

The issue with Power Nihilism, and what makes it Nihilism, is that while it may seem to make distinctions in the abstract, it never actually does; practiced consistently, Power Nihilism can make absolutely no proscriptions at all; it affirms as acceptable anything at all that does in fact happen. In this sense, it is conceptually little different to Fact Nihilism, though of course it does produce different thought and behaviour, particularly because it is almost never applied with even the remotest consistency, even in the conceptual realm (whereas Fact Nihilism usually is).

Romantic Nihilist

The Romantic Nihilist is the sort to say that 'you make your own meaning', or decide the meaning of your life. For this sort, meaning is thought to spring from the soul as an act of will. They count as a Nihilist because they reject any possibility of making any sense of values at all; they are explicitly posed as an entirely arbitrary, whimsical, effectively aesthetic choice.

Amoral Nihilist

The closest thing to a true Nihilist, because this sort of person not only has no account of morality, but genuinely does not have any morality. These tend to be very low intelligence individuals for whom moral rules are simply the imposition of others. Unable to care for the wellbeing of others, they cannot even care for their own, because this kind of Nihilism is simply the failure to even develop a morality at all in the first place. I suspect it may have little or no connection to the meaning crisis.

Selfish Nihilist

This sort of Nihilist flatly appeals to the fact that morality is not in their own self-interest, and point to the fact that, if the suffering or happiness is not theirs, they have no reason to care about it. Unlike the amoral Nihilist, this kind of person has a spoken rationale for their position, and correspondingly, is capable of caring for their own long-term wellbeing.

My objection to this kind of Nihilism relates directly to their capacity to care for their own wellbeing. I invite the Selfish Nihilist to consider why they would care about their future self's wellbeing if it is not happening right now. After much discussion, they are likely to, eventually, admit that benefits to them are just as valid whenever they happen to occur; distance from the present time makes no difference to the actual quality of anything. I then ask why it is not the same in terms of space; if you would act now for benefits in some other time, then why would you, here, not act for benefits in some other place - in other words, benefits for other people?

There are in fact many pragmatic reasons not to act for the benefit of others; but there are similarly pragmatic reasons not to act for your greater, future benefit, but pragmatic reasons are not fundamental axiological ones. I may take immediate opportunities because they are guaranteed to succeed, where a long-term one is not; and I may similarly care for myself because my efforts are more likely to succeed. But this does not concern the fundamental nature of the benefits achieved.

Despair Nihilist

Possessing a belief in higher values, but lacking a belief in the individual's ability to realise them.