Phenomenology

 Phenomenology

Here I seek to outline my most important views, most of which are on Phenomenology, which in turn I consider to be the true first philosophy. However, the way I think of phenomenology, it is possibly virtually identical to ontology or metaphysics.

        Contents
0.0 Preliminaries
0.1 What is Phenomenology
0.2. Origins
0.3. Influences

2.0 The 4 Components of Experience
2.1 Senses
2.2 Ideas
2.3 Impulses
2.4 Intentions

3.0 The Principles of Experience
3.1 The Axes
3.2 Inertia & Valence
3.3 Quality & Intentionality
3.4 Putting it Together

4.0 Functions
4.1 The Faculties

?.? Phenomenon vs 'Reality'
?.? Evolutionary Lens
?.? Correspondence to Science
?.? Presence and Absence
?.? Aristotle's 4 Causes
?.? The Absolute and the Ultimate
?.? Knowledge & Wisdom
?.? Universals
?.? Mereology

0.0 Preliminaries

0.1 What is Phenomenology

From Wikipedia: Phenomenology (from Greek φαινόμενον, phainómenon "that which appears" and λόγος, lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness.

When I say that my approach is phenomenological, or that I focus on Phenomenology, I am saying fundamentally that I am focusing on conscious experience. So I am not talking about 'things as they actually are' as we tend to mean it, something addressed by science, but rather the experiences we actually encounter that may or may not be considered to correspond to this external reality. I speak not of rocks, but of how a rock appears. I speak not of vibrations in the air, but of how things sound, our experience of hearing. And so on.

0.2 Origins

I came to focus on phenomenology firstly because of my belief in in Empiricism, or if this term offers any confusion, the Peripatetic axiom. To summarise, this is simply the idea that "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses". In other words, in order to form any valid (or perhaps, even invalid) ideas about anything, one must first receive empirical/sensory evidence
This especially comes to me from Eliezer Yudkowsky's work in the LessWrong/Rationalist community, primarily Rationality A-Z. However, to best illustrate it, here is a quote from a summary of some of that work, the 12 Virtues of Rationality;

"The sixth virtue is empiricism. The roots of knowledge are in observation and its fruit is prediction. What tree grows without roots? What tree nourishes us without fruit? If a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, does it make a sound? One says, “Yes it does, for it makes vibrations in the air.” Another says, “No it does not, for there is no auditory processing in any brain.” Though they argue, one saying “Yes,” and one saying “No,” the two do not anticipate any different experience of the forest. Do not ask which beliefs to profess, but which experiences to anticipate. Always know which difference of experience you argue about. Do not let the argument wander and become about something else, such as someone’s virtue as a rationalist. Jerry Cleaver said: “What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It’s overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball.”[2] Do not be blinded by words. When words are subtracted, anticipation remains."

The mention of prediction should be noted. It's also a very important aspect of my worldview.

Another crucial influence, one that actually predates Eliezer/LessWrong, is Zen Buddhism. In the process of mindfulness meditation, one ceases thinking, and focuses on some kind of raw experience, typically the sensation of air passing at the nose as one breaths. Such a sensation is an example of conscious experience, after all, and it's through practicing this that I gained insight into the fundamental importance of experience in our lives.

Besides these, I have always felt a need not only to see deeply into things and gain insight, but to trace those insights back to the fundamentals of things. Other words I might use besides 'fundamentals' would be ground, bottom, concrete I believe that phenomena are truly the bottom/ground/fundamental.

0.1 Influences

Although I was brought to a phenomenological approach by the above, I have influences outside of them that brought me to the specific formulation I have.

Firstly, MBTI/Jungian Personality. The Cognitive Functions, their framing, and the questions they raise have been invaluable.

Secondly, Jordan Peterson and John Vervaeke, who furthered my interest in the Psychology/Cognitive Science lens that I believe is an essential adjunct to a phenomenological approach. Aligning an understanding of the structure of our experience is necessarily supplemented by an outside, scientific understanding of cognition, and what functions it performs, especially within an evolutionary framework.

Lastly, a figure you likely will not know; Struan, whose ideas slotted everything into place. Many thanks to him personally. His project will be revealed explicitly in another post; however it now permeates all of my thinking, so this post will in large part simply explain his ideas through my own lens.

2.0 Components of Experience

I take phenomenal experience to be most usefully conceived of as having 4 elements. They can go by many names, however the following is the way I prefer to name them. Please, when reading these, bear in mind that I am talking about our experience, and not some account of the world as the hard sciences tend to speak of. Again, I am not talking about the objective world, but of subjective experience. 

The 4 components are senses, ideas, impulses, and intentions. 

2.1 Senses

By the term 'senses', I mean those experiences that are generally referred to with that word in normal speech, typically categorised into 5 types - sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. There may, however, be more, as these exclude things like hot/cold sense.

2.2 Ideas

An 'idea' in my framework is a pattern or mental image, the kind of thing we tend to refer to when we say the word thinking. The prime example of an idea is something like E = mc²; it is the phenomenon of logic. But also, when I ask you to think of a dog, the thing you come up with in your mind is the idea of a dog.

2.3 Impulses

Impulses are similar to senses, however they are not quite the same. It is quite simple to tell you that impulses are the phenomena of pleasure and pain.

2.4 Intentions

Intentions are similar to ideas, however they are not quite the same. They will need further explanation beyond this short summary, but they can be likened to impulses in that pleasure and pain roughly correspond to desire and aversion.

3.0 Principles of Experience

I have given you the basic taxonomy. However, this will not suffice for understanding. Now I will go into further depth.

3.1 The Axes

The 4 components of experience can be considered to be at the intersection of two different axes or dyads - sets of two opposites.

First is the axis of inertia & valence. Second is the axis of quality & intentionality.

3.2 Inertia & Valence

This opposition is pretty much just static vs dynamic. In cognitive terms, valence has to do with motivation, corresponding to some kind of change - be it movement of the body in action or speech, or of the mind, e.g. attention.

My notion of valence is therefore basically just this.

3.3 Quality & Intentionality

With Quality I am attempting to invoke the notion of qualia. In particular, I would like to stress this one explanation of qualia from Daniel Dennett:

"they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things"

This stands in contrast to Intentionality, and I coin the term intendent to match with qualia. Whereas qualia are non-relational properties, intendents are relational ones. More conventionally, it may be called aboutness, the way things 'point' to others. It's worth being specific here; it is not the thing that points, nor the thing pointed to, but the pointing itself that is the intendent.

3.4 Putting it Together

Senses and Ideas are both inert.
Impulses and Intentions are both valent.

Senses and Impulses are both qualia.
Ideas and Intentions are both intendents.

Senses are inert qualia.
Impulses are valent qualia.
Ideas are inert intendents.
Intentions are valent intendents.

4.0 Functions

4.1 Faculties

I have spoken of Senses, Ideas, Impulses, and Intentions. However, it is also useful to consider them as faculties that grasp the aforementioned things.

Senses are of the faculty of Sensation.
Ideas are of the faculty of Mind.
Impulses are of the faculty of Motivation.
Intentions are of the faculty of Spirit.

Taken together, Sensation and Motivation constitute the Body.
Taken together, Mind and Spirit constitute the Soul.

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